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 1 
 
EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ON THE PLANET MARS 
 
 
by David Collins∗  
 
 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
In August 2007 NASA successfully launched the $90.5 million Phoenix Spacecraft which 
is scheduled to land on the surface of the planet Mars in the spring of 2008.  The planned 
Mars Science Laboratory, another robotic spacecraft that should land on Mars in 2010, 
will cost an estimated $347 million in 2007, with further operating expenses each year.1  
Should these new missions be completed as envisioned, they will be the sixth and seventh 
devices to land on the surface of Mars sent by the United States,2 yet despite these 
significant achievements in space exploration and their enormous cost, the existing 
regime of space law tells us that Mars belongs to “common heritage of mankind”3.  
Common ownership of Mars (and the other planets as well as the Moon) and the resulting 
sharing of benefits derived from its exploration and developments disregards the unequal 
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 2 
burden of costs, and associated risks discouraging investment and productive use.  As a 
number of authors have argued, the opportunity for private profit, in one form or another, 
is an essential incentive for the advancement of space exploration4, especially as the 
expected gains are of high uncertainty.  This article will further develop this view by 
challenging the idea of common property with respect to real property on the planet Mars, 
viz. land rather than moveable goods such as minerals, and by evaluating specific ways in 
which such property rights can be allocated on the basis of efficiency.  Accordingly the 
currently hypothetical, although not improbable, human exploration and colonization of 
Mars will considered from the perspective of cost-benefit analysis.  The article concludes 
that a present and definite legal regime that recognizes geographically limited, privately 
controlled claims to land on Mars will ensure timely and productive development of our 
neighboring world. 
  
II   THE FUTURE OF MARS EXPLORATION 
Although numerous spacecraft have landed successfully on the planet or achieved orbit 
around it, a manned mission to the planet Mars is several decades away, colonization 
perhaps centuries, but there is little doubt that it will eventually occur because humans 
cannot expect to remain on Earth indefinitely, be it the result of our obviously degrading 
climate and depleted resources, or more dubious dangers such as global nuclear war or an 
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asteroid collision, or radiation from the demise of our sun in far future5.  President Bush 
indicated in his 2004 “Vision for Space Exploration” that robotic and manned missions to 
Mars were an important aspect of the American space exploration initiative.  Accordingly 
NASA plans to send a manned mission to Earth’s Moon before 2020 as a prelude to a 
manned Mars mission, which should take place within the next 20 years.6  Roskosmos, 
the Russian space agency similarly announced in August 2007 that it anticipated sending 
cosmonauts to Mars after the completion of a Lunar base in 2035.7  The European Space 
Agency (ESA)’s Aurora program included a manned mission to Mars by 2024.8 
 Serious interest in Mars will continue to intensify for two important reasons.  
First, it is far more readily capable of sustaining human life than any other planetary body 
in the Solar System.  Roughly half the size of Earth (and with about the same amount of 
dry land) Mars’ gravity and temperature are within the range of human tolerance. It is 
already known that Mars possesses vast resources of frozen carbon dioxide from which 
the important fuels of oxygen, deuterium, and helium-3, can be derived.   Liquid water is 
now thought to exist not far beneath the planet’s surface, which could be used both for its 
oxygen and for irrigation in agriculture.9 The presence of water also raises the potential 
that isolated ecosystems may exist on Mars that could provide genetic material used to 
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treat illnesses.10  Mars’ atmosphere, temperature and air pressure could be made to 
sustain human life through a complex process called terraforming, rendering the planet a 
potential refuge for humans should Earth become uninhabitable. 11 Mars has a 24 hour 
day which could allow greenhouses to be used, the only such celestial body in the solar 
system. Many useful ores may exist there that could be used on Mars to facilitate 
habitation.12  Secondly, land claims on Mars will become more significant precisely 
because of its isolation from Earth.  While Mars is close by astronomical standards; it is 
as little as 56 million kilometers away, with our current technology a mission to it would 
last at minimum two years and regular “return trips” to Earth are consequently unrealistic.  
It is therefore much more probable that Mars will eventually host a permanent, 
autonomous colony than, for example, the Moon.  This much greater time frame 
necessitates a commitment to reliable, independent systems and infrastructure.13  
Associated claims staked on land, such as mining, agricultural and settlement rights, 
could last for whole life spans of colonists or beyond.   
 
III   THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME FOR PROPERTY IN OUTER SPACE 
In order to frame properly a discussion of future real property claims on Mars, existing 
law on property in space will be considered briefly.  There are currently two relevant 
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international treaties: The Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, both of which 
establish that Mars (and the other planets) are res communis: common property owned by 
the people of Earth.  The former agreement, signed in 1967 as the result of efforts of the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), establishes 
that space is “the province of all mankind” and “free for exploration and use by all states 
without discrimination of any kind on a basis of equality” and also that there should be 
“free access to all areas of celestial bodies”14 clearly precluding the exclusivity of 
possession that is a foundation of ownership.  Celestial bodies, among them Mars, cannot 
be the subject of national appropriation by claims of sovereignty.15  The Outer Space 
treaty was signed by the United States, the USSR and 89 other nations and as such it can 
be viewed as a legally binding commitment in international law.  The later Moon Treaty, 
ratified by only seven countries, establishes that all resources outside the earth are the 
“common heritage of mankind” and that no entity, either public or private can exclusively 
own any space resource16 and that there must be “equitable sharing” by all state parties in 
the benefits derived from space resources, taking into consideration the needs of 
developing countries.17 This language of public ownership mirrors The Law of the Sea 
convention, which establishes that no nation can own the world’s oceans.18 Significantly 
the Moon Treaty permits the retention of “samples” taken from planetary bodies, 
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although it encourages that such materials be made available to other nations for the 
purposes of scientific experiment.19 The concept of personal property is thus recognized 
by the laws of space which has been interpreted by some to allow for commercial mining 
at some point.20  Although under the Moon Treaty ownership in equipment, vehicles and 
installations is retained by the party who placed them there21 this is not true ownership in 
the common law sense, as there is no right to exclude because Article XV requires that all 
vehicles, installation and equipment shall be open to use by all other parties.  This partial 
acknowledgement of private personalty may hold the potential for “quasi-sovereignty” 
involving ownership of objects on the surface of planets by individuals or corporations.22  
The simple delineation between equipment and land may be difficult to draw on Mars, 
however, because the planet’s atmosphere necessitates artificial construction, such as a 
greenhouse, in order to render the surface agriculturally productive or habitable.  
According to the common law, a chattel (in which ownership is retained in space) loses 
its status as a chattel and becomes a fixture when it is so affixed to land that it becomes 
part of the land23, and evidently according to treaty at that point ownership is lost.  In this 
way a base built upon the soil or rock of Mars for the purpose of habitation or as a 
greenhouse, even if it is resting upon the planet’s surface under its own weight without 
attachment, as long as it is intended to permanently improve the land will become a 
fixture24 and is therefore common property.   Thus there is a strong risk that an 
investment such as a base costing possibly in the billions of dollars in preparation and 
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transportation would become public property once it was placed upon the planet’s 
surface.  
Together the space treaties embody the now widely-criticized notion25  that every 
human, as represented by the states in which they are members, has an effective “right” to 
Mars.  Under this regime the allocation of Martian resources, possibly including land 
itself, will be determined by the “administrative model” in which each nation decides the 
distribution based on each country having an equal vote, much like the current United 
Nations regime.26 Not surprisingly, the United States and the Soviet Union rejected the 
limitations on the use of space resources, refusing to sign the Moon Treaty.  Indeed none 
of the signatories of the Moon Treaty has space travel capability, suggesting that it does 
not reflect any practical concerns in space exploration and development.  Rather, the 
Moon Treaty illustrates resistance to the idea of private advancement through the 
acquisition or use of space resources as expressed through the voting dominance of less-
developed nations in intergovernmental organizations.27 Still, as many legal 
commentators have noted, the benefit sharing doctrines enunciated in the treaties are 
fortuitously vague and as such have little force in international law.  At best they are 
loose policy guidelines not concrete obligations.28  Interestingly, the treaties also present 
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inconsistent principles:  the Moon Treaty’s common ownership concept contradicts the 
prohibition against national appropriation found in the Outer Space Treaty,29 although 
this is little more than a semantic distinction; appropriation implying the taking of 
something from someone else.  The ambiguity of these treaties and the fact that the Moon 
Treaty has not been ratified by space-faring nations suggests that property law in space 
remains, hopefully for the purpose of incentivization, clouded.  Many commentators, 
notably Carl W. Christol, further assert the need to clarify and formalize the law of space 
exploration generally.30  An internationally recognized legal regime for property rights on 
Mars is essential, or else uncertainty (if not the fear of expropriation in the name of 
mankind) will endanger financial investment both in reaching and then colonizing the 
planet.   
 
IV   OWNERSHIP AS AN INCENTIVE FOR PRODUCTIVE USE 
In order to clarify the best regime for property on Mars it is first necessary to clarify how 
real property is treated on Earth, at least in Common Law jurisdictions. The Common 
Law views property as a bundle of rights:  the right to use, to exclude others from use and 
to transfer those rights to others.31 As such, owning the planetary body of Mars in the 
legal sense would include the right to mine or build upon the planet’s surface, to deny 
permission to land upon it from space, possibly to put something in orbit around it, and to 
sell or otherwise transfer those rights to someone else.  Property law also recognizes the 
distinction between public and private property but this crucial distinction is problematic 
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when applied to such a vast area as an entire planet because such rights cannot be readily 
categorized as either public or private goods.  Mars is a private good in that it may (and 
likely does) contain valuable mineral resources and by definition these are private goods 
because they can only be consumed by one person to the exclusion of others32.  It has 
already been suggested that the existing treaties may acknowledge mining rights on the 
planets as such resources can be extracted and removed from the planet.  On the other 
hand the land itself, the vast terrain of the planet’s surface, could be viewed as a public 
resource, like a National Park, or the Atlantic Ocean because it can be used in a non-
rivalrous way33.  However the land on Mars is naturally inhospitable to humans and 
agriculture as we know it, so the land must be altered through the establishment of 
infrastructure like environmentally controlled bases or artificially irrigated greenhouses, 
before it can be useful in any practical sense.  Because of the enormous technological 
commitment involved, land uses of this nature will be relatively restrictive (at least at 
first) and probably of small dimension compared to the entire surface of the globe.  Such 
uses are therefore exclusive and rivalrous because there is limited room to live in a 
constructed base, limited soil under a greenhouse roof and no person can breathe the same 
artificially liberated oxygen (from the carbon dioxide atmosphere) or drink the same 
melted water.  In that sense the land of Mars should also be viewed as a private good.           
 The incentive to make these productive uses of the land of Mars necessitates non-
communal ownership because private property rights encourage the maximization of a 
resources potential because of the prospect of higher individual gains. The cost of 
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monitoring property is also negated through a regime where private entitlements are 
enforced by law.34  Similarly, it has now been widely and effectively argued35 that the 
recognition of property rights will be a strong incentive for space exploration because the 
expectation of future profit such as derived from property claims, legitimizes the 
enormous expense from a rational cost-benefit perspective.  Missions to Mars are 
particularly needful of such clear incentivization because of the high cost and uncertain 
benefits.  Recent estimates suggest that a manned mission to Mars would cost $55 billion 
US.36  The establishment of bases or other such infrastructure could cost infinitely more, 
and the value of such improved land is at best uncertain, especially as its expected utility 
may depend on some as yet unknowable future eventuality on Earth.  In contrast, equal 
distribution of Martian land in line with the Common Heritage principle would lead yield 
no profit in the economic sense, and moreover inevitably result in the “tragedy of the 
commons”; the risk of self-interested over-exploitation or under-exploitation of shared 
resources if there is no enforcement mechanism that ensures each user pulls their own 
weight.37  If each nation or person has equal claim to Mars as a matter of right and not as 
a function of contribution, then non-space faring nations and their taxpayers will avoid 
contributing in the efforts to reach and develop Mars.  No country is likely to undertake 
the enormous risks, economic and otherwise, associated with Mars colonization without 
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the legal certainty that their rewards will not be distributed to others.38  The private 
property right to exclude others from specific developed areas of the Mars, as well as to 
transfer those rights to others in a market, as well as obviously to use the land in a 
productive manner, are crucial incentives. 
A key advantage of recognizing private ownership of real property on Mars is that 
non-state bodies could become committed in the productive use of land on the planet.  
Financing a Mars mission as a business venture could be an efficient way reach the planet 
and establish human habitation there.39  Individuals or organizations could buy shares in 
the Mars mission to be compensated by land claims on the planet which would rise in 
value in proportion to the extent of colonization.  Optimal investment would be 
undermined by the uncertain legal framework of the existing treaty regime – there would 
be fear of uncompensated expropriation under the auspices of the UN or some other 
international organization favoring absolute common ownership of all extra-planetary 
resources.  Thus, as Hoffstadt has noted, a stable legal regime is required in order for 
investment in space exploration to be viable.40 A clear and consistent legal regime will 
induce productive private capitalization of Mars missions in the future and would be 
advantageous in the development of Mars.41  While the negotiation of a legal framework  
fostering investment in extra planetary land has the potential itself to be costly, it is 
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expected that the relative costs will only increase over time as more nations and 
corporations become involved, suggesting that earlier settling of legal entitlements is 
favorable. Although at present it seems unlikely that interplanetary travel, let alone 
planetary colonization, could be achieved by a corporation or other private body because 
of insufficient resource consolidation, the growing relevance of private space exploration 
is evidenced by the numerous non-market initiatives to encourage a non-state role in 
space exploration, such as the Ansari X prize for suborbital spaceflight and Google’s 
recent To the Moon prize to be awarded to the first individual to successfully place on 
object on the Moon.42  Recent successful advancements in private space flight, such as 
SpaceShipOne and the voyage of tourist Dennis Tito to the International Space Station 
may be indicative of future trends for involvement of private enterprise in this field.43  
Non-state space exploration has the economic advantage of capitalization from sources 
that would be unavailable to a publicly funded agency like NASA, such as selling the 
broadcast rights to video and audio images of the mission.  The Mars Rover and Mars 
Explorer photographs were among the most popular images on the Internet for some 
time.44  It is unlikely that private space exploration initiatives, such as ones involving the 
development of land on Mars, would occur without the prospect of economic recovery if 
not surplus profit. 
 Single state or private enterprise ownership of land on Mars is more efficient than 
an international regime of common ownership as envisioned by the Outer Space treaty 
because the transaction costs of international public action are much higher than those of 
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private entities, or even single state governments.  Epstein termed this “negativism”:  
without unanimous agreement from all members of society on how to exploit a common 
resource, it may remain unused.45  Indeed, space exploration is a notorious example of the 
difficulty in achieving collective international action.46  Common ownership of Mars 
demands international regulatory unanimity that would be both prohibitively expensive 
and potentially impossible to implement.  In contrast, private, or single sovereign 
ownership of a resource tends to result in the most efficient administration of that 
resource, for example when organizing colonization or a terraforming project on Mars, 
because bargaining among smaller groups tends to result in cooperation.47 In this way the 
first expeditions to Mars will be undertaken by the party that can do so at least cost, and 
the costs should be lower for single states or private entities because less resources will 
be expended on decision-making than in an international initiative, even one coordinated 
by a centralized body such as the United Nations.  
A Mars expedition will be undertaken when the expected benefit exceeds the cost, 
however the fact that NASA and other agencies have already expended resources in Mars 
exploration without economic gain illustrates that most, if not all, of the benefits derived 
from space exploration so far are non-market, such as the advancement of scientific 
knowledge and the satisfaction of curiosity. Similarly, a significant component of the cost 
of manned space exploration is the risk of human safety, which also cannot be readily 
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quantified for the purposes of cost-benefit assessment.  While the expense of a manned 
Mars mission would be much higher than the robotic missions to date, one might expect 
that such costs and human risks will decline over time because of corresponding increases 
in technology. The expected gains from a Mars expedition should also increase over time 
because technology should augment the extent and quality of knowledge that can be 
gained from such missions as well as the degree to which the planet can be developed 
profitably, for example with improved technology of transforming deuterium ice into an 
ready energy supply.  Thus the initial missions emerge as the least efficient from a cost-
benefit perspective. Yet property law suggests that the initial missions are the most 
important for the purpose of establishing a claim, although this may depend upon what 
activities count as possessory ones. 
 
V  LAND CLAIMS ON MARS VIA FIRST POSSESSION 
As intimated in the introduction to this article, there may be economic, and indeed moral, 
justification to assert that real property claims to terrain on Mars should already exist in 
favor of those nations that have sent probes that have landed on the surface.  Such an 
argument is in keeping with a classic interpretation from Locke, who claimed that 
possession is determined by the act of mixing one’s labor with the property.48  
Unfortunately this doctrine does not lend itself readily to celestial bodies because much of 
the early yet important “labors” of astronomy involved mere observation which pre-date 
recorded history.  It is further unreasonable to assert that, for example, Galileo could have 
claimed ownership of Jupiter’s three largest moons because he built a telescope to 
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observe them although the effort and ingenuity involved in so doing could be described as 
labor.  Similarly, imaginative private citizen Dennis Hope claimed ownership of Mars in 
a declaration delivered to the United Nations in 1980.49 However the issuance of a written 
statement alone is a legally insufficient act to connote possession under the Common Law 
and his assertion is accordingly meaningless.  Locke’s conception of possession likely 
had in mind some kind of physical interaction, such as building or repairing equipment or 
cultivating land.  This is largely reflected in the Anglo-American tradition of property law 
and its characterization of the concepts of use and possession.  In a very real sense, then, 
the five American probes which physically landed on Mars to take photographs and make 
charts mixed human labor with the planet such that America should own Mars.  This 
cannot be the correct conclusion, however, because it seems more justifiable, practically 
as well as morally, to require a putative owner herself to have a physical presence on the 
planet’s surface, at least at some point. 
 One of the complaints of the international community against sovereign claims on 
Antarctica was that there was no effective occupation by human settlers.50  This is 
because international law requires that “acts of discovery” must be perfected by a form 
administrative control, which is difficult in vast areas with harsh conditions, such as 
Antarctica or Mars.51 If human occupation is to become a requirement for recognition of 
property rights under international law, one might be tempted to conclude that Mars 
belonged to Russia while the Russian space crew is there, only to become a res nullius 
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once they departed.  Indeed, under the Common Law, acts of possession such as presence 
can establish or maintain de facto ownership of land.  The extent of the acts depends on 
the nature of the land itself and how it can be used.52 In this way, perhaps the numerous 
probes sent by Earth-based claimants could perpetuate ownership of barren Martian 
terrain if it had once been visited by humans.   It is important to recognize that Locke’s 
idea of “mixing labor” hinged on the addition of value to that property.  Therefore if a 
robotic spacecraft can map the land, analyze the soil or deposit useful goods on the 
planet’s surface that would benefit subsequent visitors, then the value of the land has 
increased.  The many small landers that were sent to Mars in recent years were intended 
to facilitate future manned missions, in part by mapping the land features.53 Rendering a 
planet more capable to sustain human visitors is an increase in its value.  However such 
claims are tenuous because of the limited physical terrain, in terms of a percentage of the 
planet’s entire surface, photographed and explored by the landing probes and also by the 
fact that their data transmissions are not permanent; the first Viking probes which landed 
on Mars in the 1970s are no longer operational, which could constitute a kind of common 
law abandonment that would negate a once existing property entitlement. 
As a more readily comprehensible as well as morally defensible system of 
property claims in space, Baca has argued that the 19th Century principle of first 
possession as in first physical presence by humans should govern the initial claims for 
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space-based resources.54  This theory was recently re-iterated by Gruner in relation to the 
Moon and the planets of the Solar System.55  Rooted in natural law, “first possession” is 
compatible with the Locke’s principle of adding value to an object by investing labor in 
it, and is the historic equivalent of a legal rule, as seen in the early settlement of the 
American frontier.56 First possession of unclaimed land as in 18th century America can be 
readily analogized to a planet as both consist of undeveloped, uninhabited physical 
space.57 Other than the scientific information we have gained from probes, Mars currently 
offers nothing other than esthetic value to humanity as a curiosity in the night sky.  Yet its 
enormous potential value as a future human settlement possibly to save humanity, can 
only be actualized as it becomes physically attainable through space travel – and habitable 
through colonization.  As Mars will be rendered valuable by adding the characteristics of 
accessibility and habitability to it, then the party who reaches and develops it first should 
be able to claim ownership of it.  In addition to compensating the first productive uses, 
first possession rewards the daring of the claimant possessor.  In literal terms, then, an 
equal distribution of property rights on Mars among all nations undermines the vast 
resources expended in the achievement of technological supremacy of states like the 
United States, Russia, and the European Union.58   
 While relatively straightforward and based upon historic precedent, the doctrine of 
first possession may not be the most efficient way to direct resources towards the 
exploration and development of Mars because the first nation to land on Mars is not 
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necessarily the one that will use the planet’s land in the most productive way.  The failure 
of homestead farms in American history showed that the rush to possess empty land 
pulled these resources out of the hands of other more productive uses that came later.59  
Under the doctrine of first possession, resources could be drawn from more productive 
uses at a rate faster than optimal.60  For example, resources spent on getting to Mars 
quickly may have been more efficiently directed to technology that could develop Mars 
more fully at some later point, or on technology that could combat the effects of global 
warming (possibly rendering humanity’s future escape to Mars unnecessary).  Of course, 
a Mars mission could lead to indirect gains - technological innovations with applications 
in other industries.  It is reasonable to expect that such innovations, for example food 
synthesis or alternative energy sources, could lead to the improvement of the standards of 
living for people on Earth, which is an explicit aim of the Moon Treaty61, as well as of the 
United Nations itself62.  Moreover there are important non-market gains to be achieved 
from winning a space race to Mars, such as a morale boost to claimant nation.  Still, one 
NASA analyst cautions that without a credible and immediate scientific purpose, such a 
“cheap-and-dirty” approach to a Mars mission would amount to little more than a 
technological demonstration.63 That the principle of first possession can lead to over-
investment in the activities that the law requires as a means of obtaining legal title 
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demands investigation into other more efficient ways of allocating real property rights on 
Mars.   
 
VI   ALLOCATING PROPERTY RIGHTS ON MARS BEFORE ARRIVAL 
In order to stimulate productive use of the land on Mars while avoiding an inefficient race 
to first possession, initial property rights allocation could be achieved via competitive 
bidding in advance of actually landing on Mars.  In this way the party that values Mars 
the most, and therein would accordingly be expected to make the most valuable use of it, 
will be granted title to the planet.  This method has been rejected as inefficient because of 
the immense bureaucracy that would be needed to conduct auctions.64  There are also 
logistical problems regarding the way in which the auction would be conducted.65 The 
more pressing problem with this system is that the winning bidder would be forced to 
expend vast resources in compensating the losers rather than in a Mars expedition itself, 
clearly an inefficient cost from the perspective of space resource improvement, much as a 
race for first possession would be.  Even if the auction were to involve the purchase of 
parcels of Martian land, rather than rights to the entire planet (as suggested below), such 
that there could be multiple “winners”, valuable resources would still be wasted in the 
purchase of the land, i.e. the allocation of pre-existing rights based on a principle of 
common ownership, that could have been channeled more efficiently into reaching or 
developing the planet. 
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The more realistic Mars exploration and settlement becomes the more costly such 
entitlement payments would become.  As future technology and the need to resort to Mars 
for resources or habitation increase, such payments could become economically 
prohibitive: it would cost more to purchase advance Martian property rights than the 
eventual profits derived from the use of that land.66  However, if compensation payments 
are static, meaning that they are locked in to a current (probably low) value that reflects 
the current high level of risk associated with a Mars mission, then the parties could 
bargain as envisioned by the Coase Theorem.67  According to the theory, goods will end 
up in the hands of the party, or parties in the case of a vast resource like a planet, who 
values a good the most.  The theory explains that initial legal entitlements are irrelevant; 
the efficient allocation of resources will be achieved through bargaining, provided that 
transaction costs are zero68.  With this in mind, putative Mars explorers could pay a 
“Mars Tax” or use tax which could distributed to all the nations of the world in 
recognition of the pre-existing entitlements of “Common Heritage of Mankind” and more 
specifically, Article XI.7b of the Moon Treaty which calls for an “equitable sharing of the 
benefits” derived from the resources of the planets.  Such an arrangement might also fit 
well with the requirement of an “international regime … to govern the exploitation of the 
natural resources” of the planets, as mandated by Article 11.5 the Moon Treaty.  Provided 
that the compensation fee was sufficiently low so as not to discourage exploration, then 
efficient development of Mars would be undertaken regardless.  A non-economically 
                                                          
66
 This is provided, of course, that such anticipated Mars missions are for economic purposes and not 
survival ones, such as escaping Earth because of our own planet’s inability to sustain life in which case 
there are strong moral, non-economic reasons 
 21 
prohibitive level of “Mars Tax” is likely given the future discount69 that many nations 
would likely place on the uncertain prospect of Mars exploration in exchange for giving 
up their claims.  A use tax on Mars would be much less prohibitive than one say on the 
Moon, the exploitation of which is more readily achievable with current technology.  
Most nations would be willing to concede future property claims of dubious (although 
potential large) value to exploring parties in exchange for guaranteed though marginal 
payment today70.  Such tax could be looked upon as an ordinary transaction cost – such as 
highway taxes or landing fees at airports that are a necessary cost associated with market 
participation.  Compensation payments of this nature might take another form – that of 
the government “taking” of property as seen in the Eminent Domain clause of the US 
Constitution71.  An international Earth government, such as some future version of the 
United Nations, could seize land on Mars for public use, for example in the event of an 
emergency on Earth, compensating the original owner in the process.  Provided that full 
market value is paid, as required for example under the Constitutional provision, then 
such a transaction amounts to efficient bargaining.  Seizures for something less than the 
full market value should be prohibited both from a standpoint of fairness as well as 
efficiency.   
As an alternative to a use tax on Mars, in order to uphold the spirit of the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, a portion of the Martian terrain could be set aside as 
common territory for the people of the Earth as envisioned in Article 7.3 of the Moon 
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Treaty which references “scientific preserves.” This land could be the interplanetary 
equivalent of land set aside for public use, such as parks, during the construction of 
housing subdivisions.  Perhaps 25% of the Martian equatorial zone, where conditions for 
human habitation are most favorable, could be reserved for public uses in the future.   
 
VII   BOUNDED FIRST POSSESSION BY LANDFALL 
As an alternative to fixing future claims on Mars based upon a re-allocation of pre-
existing ones, the most efficient mechanism of real property allocation of an un-owned 
res nullius planet Mars would be a limited form first possession: the allotment of only a 
portion of land to the first arriving organization, not the entire surface of the planet.  The 
size of the allocation would be set at the optimal level to encourage exploration and 
development while conserving land for future explorers.  The first landers could claim all 
terrain, for example, within a hundred kilometer radius of their landing point subject to an 
increase if productive use is made of an even larger portion.  The rest of the planet would 
remain un-owned and available to become possessed by subsequent explorers.  This 
bounded first possession is in keeping with the language of the Outer Space Treaty and 
Moon Treaties which prohibits only sovereign claims to the celestial body, which could 
be taken to mean the planetary sphere itself.  Such a credible interpretation reads in the 
word “entire” to the following provision for the purpose of clarity: “neither the entire 
surface or entire subsurface of the Moon [or Mars] shall become the property of any 
State.”72  Partial allocation as described is just because landing on one minuscule portion 
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of a world should not entitle a claimant to ownership of all of it, much of which may be 
left completely idle by the original explorer, resulting in an inefficient use of the planet’s 
resources. The problem of inefficient races to achieve the legal right to first possession 
will be avoided by this regime, as second and third place finishers will be rewarded with 
other plots of land on the surface.  Consequently pre-mature and therefore non-productive 
missions will be avoided because there is no risk of exclusion for failing to land first; the 
marginal benefit of arriving second will be as high as the marginal benefit of arriving 
first.  Of course, the pride engendered by first arrival, such as that generated by the first 
Moon landing, would help to encourage earlier Mars expeditions rather than later ones.  
Incentive to settle Mars before others may similarly result from the fact that some regions 
of the planet could be more valuable than others.  For example, the equatorial zone would 
probably hold greater value because of their warmer climates just as the flat, northern 
hemisphere would may be more conducive for agriculture than the rugged southern 
hemisphere.73  Part of the concern of developing nations in espousing the Common 
Heritage principle for planetary bodies was that by the time nations with weaker initial 
resource endowments (the developing world) are capable of exploiting the land on Mars, 
the planet’s resources will already be depleted.74 Plot ownership would address this 
concern as vast regions of Mars would likely remain un-owned for centuries, giving 
developing nations a chance to “catch up”.   
 Private easements and restrictive covenants arrived at by bargaining among the 
landed owners (rather than through international political consensus) and enforced 
through private litigation would control competing land uses such as over exploitation or 
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pollution in order to produce an efficient allocation of resources.  At least in the early 
stages of colonization there would be no need to incur the cost of a special “Mars Court” 
to adjudicate such disputes, instead landowners could litigate in the courts of their choice 
on Earth, subject of course to that court’s own rules on taking jurisdiction.  Thus for 
example an American corporation owning land on Mars could bring suit in nuisance 
against another American land owner in the Federal court of the United States75.  
Disputes between sovereign land owners on Mars could similarly be brought in the 
International Court of Justice76. Again, it is expected that such private land use 
adjudication among fewer parties should be less costly than public control of commonly 
held land through regulation.77  Moreover, bargaining among a limited number of initial 
owners should arrive upon the most efficient manner of land use without the need to 
resort to lawsuits. Excessive land use regulation resulting from the need to satisfy all 
decision-makers could diminish the overall productivity of the land, especially if such 
regulations were imposed ex post and thus wasted resources already spent on existing 
activities. It is further expected that land owners on Mars would adopt the self-imposed 
obligation to engage in reasonable and productive use of that land in order to maximize 
the value of their own holdings.  Such “injunctions against waste”78 would become more 
significant in later stages of settlement when vacant land on Mars has become scarcer.  
Accordingly, if a plot is not being used efficiently, for example by an owner that held 
expertise in space travel but not in colonization, then title in the land could be transferred 
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on the authority of a court, perhaps through the Common Law doctrine of adverse 
possession79, to another party that had these skills and intentions.   
Should a terraforming project be undertaken – transforming the whole of Mars 
into an environment that could sustain life - landowners would have an incentive to “free 
ride” by not contributing resources to such an inherently communal project, allowing 
them to benefit from the labors of others without cost.  Perhaps a mandatory fee could be 
imposed upon all residents by a court in order to address this problem – although it is 
unclear what legal precedent could be invoked to do so, at least in advance of the 
establishment of zoning or centralized governance on the planet.80  Market forces should 
provide, however, that a party not adding value to its land through development would 
have an incentive to sell or lease it to a party that would make a more productive use of it.  
Thus the first explorers might wish simply to sell their claims, as suggested above. To 
facilitate such bargaining among landowners, the establishment of a land registry system 
which would also set standardized plot dimensions and record transactions would be 
necessary, representing one of the few costs associated with private ownership of land on 
Mars.81  
The recognition of bounded land claims on a planet appears already to be 
envisioned by the text of the Moon Treaty which, as noted above, permits individual 
states to retain jurisdiction and control over their personal property brought to the moon, 
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such as bases and equipment.82  However, as noted above, the rights in such chattels are 
not full property rights such as those exercised by terrestrial landowners as there is no 
exclusivity – treaty requires parties to allow others to use these equipment and facilities 
when requested.83  On one hand such compulsory property sharing is economically 
efficient because it would encourage further development by minimizing one of the 
costliest aspects of settlement.  A subsequent arrival could benefit from existing 
infrastructure devoting resources to the more productive development of the region 
without redundant expenditure that would impede overall progress.  However, the 
common property regime envisioned by the space treaties ignores the reality that without 
adequate compensation for such sharing there might be an incentive to free-ride by 
waiting for another explorer to incur the initial costs of establishing a Mars base with 
oxygen / fuel production facilities.  It would therefore be more cost effective to be the 
second or third Mars colonizer, potentially inducing a strategic waiting game.  To resolve 
this problem it should be permissible to charge a fee for the use of one’s facilities because 
such fees represents the fundamental economic gain of granting property rights in land on 
Mars – developed land, such land with a base upon it that could sustain human life, 
becomes valuable to subsequent visitors and this can generate revenue that will offset the 
initial costs.  Bargaining would naturally set the use fee at an optimal level that 
encouraged subsequent parties to land and make use of existing facilities but yet would 
not be too low to deter the initial landing and construction.  Thus the direction to share 
resources in the Moon Treaty might be unnecessary – sharing might increase wealth for 
all parties, much as land values increase in proportion to the rise in population of an area.  
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Given that large scale inhabitation of Mars might only result from a catastrophe on Earth 
there may be some need to incorporate the common law defense of necessity for 
emergency trespass, although this defense would not preclude the payment of reasonable 
compensation for use or damage to existing infrastructure.84 
 
VII   CONCLUSION 
The much-maligned Common Heritage of Mankind doctrine is little more than “a lofty 
academic concept that looks good on paper, but fails in practice”85 that has done a 
disservice to space exploration.  When the immanent manned missions are ultimately 
undertaken we can expect that they will not be as productive as they might have been 
because the prohibitive uncertainty of expected tangible gain is exacerbated by a legal 
regime that disregards private ownership of extra terrestrial land that may be enhanced, at 
great cost, to support human life.  The potential of the planet Mars as a future site of 
human settlement is predicated on an investment in infrastructure on the planet’s surface 
to render it habitable for long-term human habitation.  In order to facilitate such 
productive activities and to create incentives for manned missions to Mars, international 
law must allocate private and sovereign ownership of real property on the planet in a 
manner that will allow the recovery of costs through user fees imposed upon subsequent 
visitors.  This article has suggested a system of bounded first possession by landfall of 
limited plots of land on Mars, the use of which will be controlled by relatively low cost 
private bargaining and litigation.  Although multiple ownership may negate the 
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competition of a winner takes all approach, this system will foster efficient investment in 
space travel and colonization because it will offer the potential of reward for effort to as 
many explorers who wish to undertake the risk.  A stable legal regime such as this must 
be put in place now as the first manned missions are being planned so we can achieve the 
timely and beneficial development of Mars in anticipation of a time when it will host our 
future generations.   
